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Most scholarship on the history of Taiwanese society considers 1945 as either a starting 
point or an ending point. The history of the medical profession offers us a rich array of 
phenomena to trace transitions in Taiwanese society across this divide, in a way that is 
empirically grounded and analytically subtle. Formal medical education began in colonial 
Taiwan in 1897. What began as an intensive program in first-aid soon expanded to a formal 
medical school in 1902 and eventually became a part of the Japanese imperial university 
system in 1928. While the Japanese medical profession is most commonly associated with its 
German influences, colonial medicine in Taiwan also adopted several aspects of British 
tropical medicine, creating a truly unique hybrid.
1
 Under this system, generations of medical 
                                                
1
 Liu Shiyung, “Building a Strong and Healthy Empire: The critical period of building Japanese colonial 
medicine in Taiwan,” Japanese Studies 24(3): 301-314. 
 2 
 
professionals in Taiwan were guided by professional criteria of German medicine in general 
practice and British standards in tropical medicine until the 1950s.  
Captured at the end of World War II and formally transferred to Chinese rule (KMT 
government), Taiwan eventually grew to become part of China not only in administrative 
viewpoints but also in epidemic definitions. During the 1940s and early 1950s the Chinese 
governors of Taiwan were greatly tormented with various epidemics from China as well as 
friction within the medical profession. With a long history of accepting American teaching, 
Chinese medical professionals, especially military surgeons, attempted to remodel Taiwan’s 
Japanese heritage of medicine to meet American criteria with a coating of nationalist 
propaganda. Ironically, without the immediate pressure of post-war epidemics, the effort to 
re-shape medical professionalism in Taiwan might merely have resulted in conflicts among 
medical factions. But between 1945 and 1952, epidemic plague and severe cholera were 
spread to Taiwan by Chinese emigrants and soldiers. Arguments over the appropriate medical 
model had to put aside and a search launched for better prevention and treatment. Defeating 
epidemics soon became the common ground to unite Japanese-trained and 
American-influenced medical professionals in Taiwan. Meanwhile, disagreement over 
Japanese sanitation versus American practice was forming after the new anti-malaria program 
was set. 
 
General condition of public health in post-war Taiwan 
Changes of government, inflation, economic depression, population movement, 
shortage of medication, and neglect of the public health infrastructure all contributed to the 
resurgence of infectious diseases in 1946 and 1947. Cases of cholera, small pox, and plague 
were reported on the island, and it was estimated that more than one million people were 
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infected with malaria during these years.
2
 Japanese/colonial standards of sanitation and 
public health practice were, in most instances, far below current standards that the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the China Medical Board (CMB) had proposed to China 
since the 1930s.
3
 The 1945 standards that Taiwan had attempted to maintain had been 
allowed to deteriorate due to the diversion of labor and materials to the war effort. 
Vaccination programs against diseases such as smallpox were either completely discontinued 
or were not enforced. Environmental sanitation was virtually nonexistent, presenting a 
definite threat of epidemics of diarrhea, dysentery, typhoid and other enteric diseases. Public 
water supply and waste collection facilities had been severely damaged in areas that were 
bombed or which despaired of financial crisis. Those that escaped the devastation of war had 
deteriorated badly through neglect as well as the shortage of materials and supplies.
4
     
The Rockefeller Foundation and China Medical Board were two major American 
resources that attempted to deal with problems in post-war Taiwan. They mostly emphasized 
that the future depended upon the continuation of the education and training of Taiwanese 
personnel in the theory and practice of sanitation works. According to one evaluation in 1946, 
sanitation in post-war Taiwan, learning from Japanese colonial rules, was a combination of 
modern and medieval practices. The use of night soil for fertilizer, public bathing in 
community bath houses, sleeping and living on wooden floors in small, damp houses, and 
many other customs presented various problems in public health. Before WWII, control of 
environmental sanitation in Taiwan was accomplished through the Sanitary Police Force. 
This police force was limited in budget and lacked proper training in public health.
5
 After 
1952, long-rage plans for future improvements were formulated by International Health 
Division of Rockefeller Foundation; however, the speed with which their project could be 
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accomplished was dependent to a great degree upon the cooperation of local governments 
and medical professionals in Taiwan. 
 
From quarantine control to anti-malaria program 
Prior to the WWII the colonial quarantine system in Taiwan was operated by local 
governments without national coordination. Quarantine provisions, therefore, varied 
according to local ground rules and lacked uniformity. The first step toward reorganization of 
the quarantine service was the adaptation and publication of port quarantine regulations in 
August, 1945. While stringent compared to the requirements of a modern standards based on 
CMB’s suggestions, the high incidence of communicable diseases in Taiwan necessitated the 
adoption of such strict measures.  
In order to stop the further spread of epidemics from costal China, new regulations for 
port quarantine were set according to contemporary standards. These regulations were 
prepared and became effective in December 1946. The seaports of entry were operated by 
Taiwanese personnel under the supervision of laboratory-trained Chinese officials under 
American supervision. Due to harsh conditions in post-war Taiwan, stringent immunization 
requirements were necessary in 1947 when the revised regulation was enforced to bring them 
more in line with standard international quarantine practices.
6
 Under the supervision of the 
Prevention Division of Southeast China, a section of National Health Administration of 
Chinese government and a channel to run foreign medical aids, quarantine controls proved 
successful in preventing the entry of communicable diseases into Taiwan. The largest mass 
emigration, approximately 2 million refugees to Taiwan between 1949 and 1950, was 
completed without the significant outbreak of epidemics. 
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Despite effective quarantine control before 1950, the return of Chinese Republican 
government to Taiwan also ended the spread of diseases between the two sides of Taiwan 
Strait. With the threat of transmitting communicable diseases from China reduced, malaria, 
an endemic problem, again caught the Americans attention.  
With financial support from the US government and the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) started to rebuild the health stations in 
every township in 1945.
7
 They also reestablished the formerly Japanese-led malaria research 
center (Taiwan Provincial Malaria Research Institute, TAMRI) as the scientific arm of control 
efforts and linked the research base in Taiwan to the headquarters in Nanjing.
8
 By the end of 
1952, all 155 of the pre-war malaria stations had reopened. TAMRI held seven sessions of 
intensive four-week training courses for the 227 former technicians of the stations. The 
practice of “island-wide simultaneous malaria parasite surveys among preschool-age 
children” was resumed in 1950 and lasted for ten years. To organize this extensive survey, 
TAMRI, working with experts from RF, convened a series of meetings with the technicians of 
the anti-malaria stations. At these meetings, clean slides, anti-malaria drugs, report forms, and 
all other necessary supplies were provided. On December 17, 1951, the first survey since 
WWII was carried out, and blood smears were taken and examined. Among the 13,885 
children examined in the survey, 1,198 (8.63%) tested positive for malaria.
9
 
In addition to reestablishing the anti-malaria stations, JCRR also supported the 
establishment and building and of local health centers in every town. There were only 56 
local health centers and 775 public health personnel in place between 1946 and 1949. With  
financial support from the JCRR, and prior American support, the numbers increased to 252 
centers and 1,486 personnel in 1950, to 356 centers and 2,208 personnel in 1951, and finally 
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in 1954, to 367 centers – one in every town on the island. Each health center had at least three 
fulltime personnel, consisting of a doctor, nurse, and midwife. The JCRR provided the 
centers with bicycles, medical supplies, and free medications. They even provided monthly 
financial support of US$ 30 to 60 to cover the traveling expenses of the public health 
workers’ home and school visits.10 Essentially, JCRR sponsorship made it possible for 
Taiwan to restore a functioning public health infrastructure within ten years of the war’s end. 
 
DDT: A New Chemical Weapon from American Friends 
Also under JCRR sponsorship, TAMRI resumed the formerly Japanese-led research 
program in 1946 and initiated a series of new investigations that built on colonial knowledge 
but emphasized new medicines and technologies rather than prevention through public health 
infrastructure. TAMRI planned the environmental engineering of mosquito-breeding streams, 
particularly around the coal-mining towns of Jilong. They tracked the geography and 
seasonality of mosquito habitats in rice farming areas, and the relationship between mosquito 
prevalence and the growing seasons for rice. In addition, they conducted clinical trials for the 
new anti-malarial drug chloroquine, both for prophylaxis and cure. Most importantly, they 
experimented with new pesticides. Finding that spraying DDT on rice fields was ineffective – 
it was both laborious and inefficient in reaching mosquito larvae in paddy water – they 
concluded that residual spraying of houses was the best option. 
The DDT program launched in 1951 directly linked anti-malarial activities in Taiwan 
to a global effort in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO). With the aid of 
the new “chemical weapon,” namely the effective, long-lasting, and inexpensive pesticide 
DDT, the ambitious Global Malaria Eradication Program aimed to eliminate the 
parasite-carrying mosquitoes within every household. The eradication method developed by 
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Dr. Fred Soper, the world’s most influential malaria expert after WWII, was based on modern 
warfare, in which task forces of uniformed men armed with spray guns went on 
search-and-destroy missions.
11
 Taiwan was one of the first countries to embark on this “war 
on mosquitoes,” four years before the US-funded global malaria eradication program was 
announced at the eighth World Health Congress in 1955. 
 The 1951 agreement between the KMT government of Taiwan and the WHO was an 
“Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for Economic Development.” The first objective 
of this agreement was to assist the government in “the control of malaria and eventually the 
eradication of this disease in the whole island of Taiwan, with modern methods at the lowest 
feasible cost.” 12 The project aimed to control malaria and other insect-borne diseases and to 
improve the general health of the population, agricultural production, and the general 
economy of Taiwan. The eradication program was preceded for by two years of experiments 
to ensure that it would be evidence-based. There were scientific studies on the effectiveness 
of DDT spraying on different walls, field research into mosquito habitats, and 
cost-effectiveness studies of different eradication procedures.
13
 Even the operation models of 
the house-spraying teams were experimentally verified. The successful program benefited 
from generous financial and technical support from the US, excellent Japanese-trained local 
malariologists, well-trained house-spraying teams, and highly cooperative Taiwanese 
residents.
14
 
Using the scientific evidence collected between 1952 and 1954, an island-wide 
anti-malaria DDT-spraying operation was finally undertaken in 1954. News coverage of the 
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planned malaria eradication program had begun as early as July 13, 1952, well before 
spraying commenced. In a series of newspaper interviews, TAMRI director Dr. C. K. Liang 
explained the details of the program to the general public.
15
 On the eve of operations, in a 
letter to all county and city governments, Dr. Liang outlined the “principles of the publicity 
campaign for anti-malaria DDT-spraying operation.” He wrote that the operation was “an 
enterprise unprecedented in Taiwan.” 16 For this reason the understanding and enthusiastic 
support of the people at all social levels was indispensable for the success of the operation, 
and a publicity campaign for the operation is of considerable importance accordingly. 
TAMRI made handbills and posters for the campaign and suggested several actions, 
including attending villagers’ meetings, asking for school masters’ and local opinion leaders’ 
support, putting up the posters along main streets, using loudspeakers for local propaganda, 
and showing related slides at cinemas. They also suggested that local governments ask for 
news reporters’ support. While the sanitary policemen of the Japanese colonial period had 
long ago disappeared after WWII, there is some evidence that Taiwanese police forces were 
involved in the malaria eradication program. An “Order to Prohibit Wiping Off DDT after 
Being Sprayed” was issued by the governor of Taiwan in 1953; it stated that wiping off DDT 
in the course of general house-cleaning was a “serious mistake” and that doing so “not only 
nullified the great amount of insecticides and manpower used in the DDT spraying 
completely, but also greatly hampered the four years of malaria control in this project.”17 
Following the conclusion of the Second Asian Malaria Conference for the Western 
Pacific and South-East Asia Regions in 1954, it was decided to extend the malaria eradication 
program in Taiwan for another two years in order to spray the whole island. The extended 
plan was to include the non-endemic metropolitan area in 1956, and would be limited to 
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high-endemic areas and the aborigine villages in 1957. The budget of the extended program 
was provided by the Council for United States Aid and Foreign Operations Administration. In 
May 1958, the government of Taiwan again signed a “Plan of Operations for Malaria 
Eradication in Taiwan, China, FY-1959-FY-1963.”18 The term “eradication” was widely used 
in the document prepared by the TAMRI. 
 
Concluding remarks: Taiwanese confidence in American medicine 
The final victory of the Taiwanese war against malaria came in 1965, when Taiwan 
entered the WHO Official Register of Malaria Eradication. The official WHO malaria-free 
designation was not an easy goal to achieve and was even more difficult to maintain. To stay 
in the WHO Official Register of Malaria Eradication, a country must have the financial 
resources and operational facilities to prevent the reintroduction of the disease. How did 
Taiwan reach the goal of eradication so soon and maintain its malaria-free status for so long? 
According to Spielman and D’Antonio, all successful malaria eradication programs either 
occurred in island countries or were directed against easy-to-kill mosquito species.
19
 It could 
very well be the case that Taiwan was the perfect size for an island and that Anopheles 
minimus, the major parasite-carrying mosquito in Taiwan, was an easily killed species of 
mosquito. Further, the strict border controls enforced by the Martial Law from 1949 to 1987 
also made Taiwan an unusually restricted area for immigration and travel.
20
 Nevertheless, the 
true story in Taiwan behind the simple metaphor of the “war against malaria” may be more 
complex than Spielman and D’Antonio suggest. 
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As the DDT program was so powerful and easy to implement, the functions of 
anti-malaria stations in collecting blood samples and providing necessary preventive 
education to the public eventually became unimportant. American aid to rebuild the colonial 
anti-malaria infrastructure was redirected to train more spraying teams and produce more 
DDT powder. The DDT program seemed so promising that the demand for preventive public 
education waned. Even the medicines for active malaria patients were neglected in all 
government reports. 
Medication for treatment was not included in the long list of equipment, supplies, and 
technical literature to be provided by the WHO in 1952.
21
 A 1956 document also used the 
victory of anti-malaria before the 1960s to encourage the authorities “improving public health 
and medical infrastructure by American standards.”22 In the mean time, more medical 
professionals and public health workers were put under the training program provided by the 
Americans in Taiwan or aboard.
23
 With the quick success of the DDT program, and a new 
generation of Taiwanese public health workers, trained by Americans, U.S. aid soon became a 
panacea for a great array of medical problems. 
The impacts beyond the American financial support for the malarial eradication 
programs are clearly significant. Because of its reputation in quarantine control and malarial 
eradication before the 1950s, American medical professionalism eventually guided the 
medical reform in Taiwan between 1952 and 1965, creating new professional standards for 
the post-war generation. After 1955, the medical college of the former Japanese Imperial 
University eventually adopted the American system of medical education.  
Within the overall process of medical professionalization in Taiwan, this transition 
from Japanese colonial medicine to American standards brought several major changes. In 
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the colonial period the paternalistic model of the doctor–patient relationship was accepted. 
The doctor, often working alone in a private clinic, was the expert who decided what was in 
the best interests of his patients, who were passive. This comfortable model was upset after 
1955 as American medical aid inserted American professional standards into the training and 
support of Taiwanese pupils. Most young medical students began receiving their training in 
an American style curriculum. By 1965, 78% of high-ranking medical professionals in the 
central government and university hospitals had received training at Harvard or Johns 
Hopkins, not to mention other institutions in the US, according to a preliminary survey. To 
them, well-equipped hospitals, not private clinics, were the preferred location for medical 
treatment, and the doctor-patient relationship they had been trained to perform now treated 
the patient as an active customer to whom the doctor provided a service. 
Despite all the changes stemming from Taiwanese confidence in American’s capability 
of disease control, questions about changes in the transformation of medical professionalism 
must be considered in a broader context than simply the new training curriculum, the new 
expectations of the professional medical career, and the new condition of medical resources 
after the 1950s. There should be a much broader agenda to seek answers for such questions in 
the tangled inner reconstruction of the medical profession in Taiwan and in the external 
foreign-aid policy organizations of the U.S. The most important media between these two 
sides (Taiwan and US) would be Rockefeller Foundation and its coordinator the China 
Medical Board. 
